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Goddard:
State and Local Taxation: The Public Purpose
Exemption in Florida
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. XVIII
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: THE PUBLIC PURPOSE
EXEMPTION IN FLORIDA
Daytona Beach Racing & RecreationalFacilitiesDistrictv. Paul,
179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965)
In 1960 and 1961 Volusia County levied taxes on land held by the
Daytona Beach Racing 8&Recreational Facilities District. The district
was established as a "body politic" under Florida law with the power
to lease and contract for operation and construction of an automobile
speedway in the Daytona Beach area. The district entered into such
a lease with the Daytona International Speedway Corporation, a
private profitmaking venture. Volusia County brought suit to enforce collection of the taxes. The First District Court of Appeal sustained the validity of the taxes on the basis that the leasing agreement
indicated the project was primarily private, not public, in character.
On certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court, HELD, the communitywide economic benefits from operation of the speedway constituted
sufficient public purpose to exempt the property. Judgment reversed.
Under Florida statutory law a private corporation holding public
land may be exempted from taxation if it performs a "public function
or purpose" on that land.' This provision represents a phraseological
departure from the Florida Constitution, which permits exemptions
while the private firm is performing a "municipal purpose. ' ' 2 The
phrase "municipal purpose" has been subjected to two generalized
definitions. The more liberal view holds that such purposes include
anything pertaining to a public or governmental function. 3 The
second, more restrictive, view limits municipal purpose to the governmental or public functions performed by the city within the corporate
limits. 4
Florida gave tentative recognition to the liberal view in Saunders
v. City of Jacksonville5 when the Florida Supreme Court invalidated
1.

FLA. STAT.

§ 192.62 (2) (c) (1965).

2. "The legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation ...
and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation . . . excepting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, educational,
literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes." FLA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1.
3. City of Louisville v. Babb, 75 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1935); City of Mattoon v.
Graham, 386 Ill. 180, 53 N.E.2d 955 (1944); MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§44.70 (3d ed. 1963).
4. Horton v. Commissioners, 43 Ala. 598 (1869); State v. Board of Levee
Comm'rs, 109 La. 403, 33 So. 385 (1902), on rehearing, 109 La. 415, 33 So. 397
(1903); Davis v. City of Taylor, 128 Tex. 39, 67 S.W.2d 1033 (1934). Although
this limited definition still receives judicial recognition, it has seldom been
used as the basis of decision.
5. 25 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1946).
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taxes on electric power lines operated outside the city limits by a
public utility. In 1961 the court gave full recognition to the liberal
view in Gwin v. City of Tallahassee.6 In the latter case the property
involved was not only outside the corporate limits but also the utility
sold power for a profit to residents outside the city. The court nonetheless held that the property was exempt because it was being used
for a valid public purpose.
Both the Saunders and Gwin cases involved public corporations.
Initially the Florida courts were not as liberal when the corporation
was of a private, profitmaking nature. Relying on article XVI, section
16, of the Florida Constitution/ private corporations were not exempted unless their activities were devoted exclusively to one of the
purposes stated in the constitutional provision.8
In the 1940's, however, the Florida courts began to receive cases
in which the private corporation based its exempt status on legislative
enactments as provided for by article IX, section 1. 9 In State v. City
of Tallahassee'1 the legislature had authorized the city to issue tax
exempt bonds to finance construction of an office building for rental'
purposes. The Florida Supreme Court accepted the legislature's
declaration of public purpose as controlling and validated the bonds.
Thus the court ratified the earlier Florida rule that the legislative
determination of what is a valid "public purpose" is controlling unless it violates organic law or is utterly irrational or arbitrary.1
Such an abdication of judicial responsibility was not destined to
go unaltered, but it has had lasting effect. In the early 1950's the
court refined the rule to some extent. In State v. Daytona Beach
Racing & RecreationalFacilitiesDistrict12 the Florida Supreme Court
validated the bonds on which the raceway was financed. The court
continued to give weight to the legislative declaration of public purpose. The court, however, also based its decision on the fact that the
public purpose involved was predominant and the private benefit
6. 132 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1961).
7. "The property of all corporations . . . shall be subject to taxation unless
such property be held and used exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal,
educational, literary or charitable purposes." FLA. CoNsT. art. XVI, §16.
8. Panama City v. Pledger, 140 Fla. 629, 192 So. 470 (1939); State v. Belleair,
125 Fla. 669, 170 So. 434 (1936); City of Bradenton v. State, 88 Fla. 381, 102 So.

556 (1924).
9. FLA. CoNsr. art. IX, §1. Unlike article XVI, §16, this provision merely
allows the legislature to grant exemptions when the corporation performs one of
the purposes stated'in the provision.
10. 142 Fla. 746, 195 So. 402 (1940).
11. City of Jacksonville v. Oldham, 112 Fla. 502, 150 So. 619 (1933).
12. 89 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1958). This case is not to be confused with the principle
case, Daytona Beach Racing 8- Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So. 2d 349
(Fla. 1965), which will be referred to as the Paul case.
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incidental. Such language was rare in the decisions before 1950, but
has become an accepted rationale in the decisions since.13
With the decision in the Paul case the law of the state has reached
a point at which, once a legislative exemption based on public purpose is present, it will control unless the actual operation of the
facility on public land is such that the public purpose is in fact only
incidental. The comparison of the private vis-;i-vis public purpose is
not as clear a test as it may seem on the surface. The lower court
opinion 1 4 found that the lease, drawn subsequent to the bond validation suit,15 indicated that the facility's purpose was primarily private
not public. Despite a lengthy discussion by the lower court of the
contractual details of the lease, the Florida Supreme Court virtually
ignored the issue. Instead the court relied on dicta in the earlier
validation suit to the effect that: "Even ignoring its use by the District for periods aggregating one-half the year, or more, for other
recreational and educational purposes ... the facility in question, con-

sidering the uses to which it will be adopted and their expected
effect on the public welfare, is infinitely more a valid public purpose
than would any of the schemes contemplated in the [lease] ....,,16
The public purpose relied on here is not any minor benefit derived
from occasional public use of the facility during its "off-season." Instead the public purpose on which the decision rests is the commercial
and economic benefits derived by the community from the private
operation per se. It is not the details of the contractual relationship
that determine the primacy of the public purpose over the private.
Instead the actual operation and effect of the facilities will resolve
the issue.
As applied, the public vis-A-vis private purpose test opens the
possibility of lucrative tax exemptions to numerous corporations,
sports facilities, and tourist attractions. A large industrial complex,
a major league football team, or a nationally known tourist attraction
all may bring with them far greater economic benefits to the community than the profit realized by their operators. Assuming that
13. State v. Inter-American Center Authority, 143 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1962); State
v. Clay County Dev. Authority, 140 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1962); State v. Cotney, 104
So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1960).
14. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities District v. Paul, 157 So.
156 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
15. After the validation suit the bond issue failed to raise sufficient revenue
for construction of the facility. As a result, a new leasing arrangement was
drawn up between the district and the private corporation. By the terms of the
second lease the corporation was to assume the construction as well as the operation
of the facility. In return the district agreed to reduce substantially its right to
use the facility.
16. State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d
34, 37 (Fla. 1958).
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there is a legislative grant of exemption, there is no reason why the
principle of Paul would not justify such exemptions in the courts.
The Florida Supreme Court, however, has balked at applying the
principle to purely industrial or manufacturing corporations. In
State v. Suwannee County Development Authority" the court refused
to validate bonds designed to finance land purchases to be used exclusively by a private manufacturing concern. The court used the
"exclusive" provision as a means of holding that the public purpose
was incidental to the private gain. Even though this case was decided
five years before Paul, a strong dissent advances the same principle
that was to carry the day five years later. The dissent argued that
Suwannee County was an agrarian, underdeveloped area. A new industry could drastically alter and improve the county's economic
position. With such an industry present would not the communitywide benefits far outweigh any private gain by the corporation?
The Suwannee County case is significant in two respects. First,
it was decided before Paul and, as a result, the case cannot properly
be said to limit the scope of the Paul decision. Second, Suwannee
County involved an attempt to use bond money to finance government purchase of land for private use. This runs afoul of the recognized Florida rule that eminent domain may not be used for the sole
purpose of making property available for private use.18 Consider,
however, the following hypothetical. A county development authority,
established by state law, leases a five-hundred acre tract held by a
municipal corporation within the county. The authority then issues
bonds to finance development of the land as an industrial park.
Acme Cellulose & Paper Products, Inc. offers to sublease the land
and build a $25 million plant on the land if it is tax exempt. With
Paul now a part of Florida case law, and without the eminent domain problem, Acme would apparently qualify as tax exempt
property.
The decision in the principle case goes to one of the most significant policy issues in Florida today. At the core of the issue lies the
question of how best to stimulate the growth and development of
the state. Tax benefits may, and perhaps actually do, stimulate economic development. But the quantum and quality of services provided by the local government may prove an equally significant incentive. Without a broad and stable source of tax revenue the local
government's ability to provide expanded services is distinctly limited.
The Paul decision clarifies the law of tax exemptions in Florida.

17. 122 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1960).
18. Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952);
State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
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